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This  paper,  based  on  my  concluding  remarks  at  the  “Colloquium  on  the  Economic 
Aspects of Gambling Regulation: EU and US Perspectives” held at Tilburg in November 
2006,  discusses  the  question  why,  in  Europe,  some  service  sectors  (such  as  network 
industries) are liberalised, while others (like the gambling sector) are not. In both, the 
discussion appears to be one-sided. In the former, the focus is on consumer benefits, 
where in the latter, only  the possible consumer harm associated with liberalisation is 
discussed. A proper balancing of costs and benefits can, and should, be subsumed under 
the ECJ’s proportionality test, as formulated in Gambelli. If this more economic approach 
is taken, the result might very well be less restrictive policy towards gambling and games 
of chance. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In  some  service  industries,  the  European  Commission  has  been  following  a  vigorous 
policy of opening up the European markets to competition, a process that is also known 
as market liberalisation. This policy has been and is pursued especially in the so-called 
network  industries  (post,  transport,  energy  and  telecommunications),  in  which  the 
services  are  delivered  over  networks  that  frequently  have  the  character  of  a  natural 
monopoly. Traditionally monopolistic suppliers, frequently operated by the state itself, 
offered these services but, over the last 25 years or so, a wave of structural reform has 
swept  these  industries.  The  industries  were  restructured,  with  the  monopolistic 
bottlenecks separated from the competitive segments, and the resulting markets being 
opened for competition, also by competitors from abroad. In the process, state owned 
companies were frequently privatised. Along the way, public interest objectives were, 
and are still guaranteed by regulation rather than by means of government provision. 
 
In other service sectors, the gambling industry being a prominent example, we have not 
(yet) seen such drastic structural changes. These industries (with the possible exception 
of lotteries, where network effects might be important) are not natural monopolies, but 
legal monopolies, with entry being prohibited by government regulation. For sure, the 
national monopolies have been challenged; sometimes by firms that are monopolies in 
other  markets,  but  these  attacks  have  not  yet  led  to  actual  market  entry,  as  most 
governments  have  been  unwilling  to  give  up  the  monopoly  rights.  In  the  gambling 
industry, the European Commission has been remarkably cautious. For example, in the 
Press Release IP/06/436, in which the Commission announced that it had taken the first 
step  in  an  infringement procedure  under  Article 226  of  the  EC  Treaty  against  seven 
Member States, the responsible Commissioner McCreevy states “I don’t underestimate 
the  sensitivities  that  exist  in  many  Member  States  on  the  question  of  gambling.  In 
sending these letters [officially requesting information on restrictive national legislation 
regarding the supply of sport betting services, EvD], we are not seeking to liberalise the 
market in any way. Rather, we are seeking reassurance that whatever measures Member   3 
States have in place are fully compatible with existing EU Law, or have been brought 
fully into line.” (European Commission, 2006). Subsequent press releases on this topic, 
such as IP/06/1362 and IP/07/909 have used similarly cautious language. 
 
In this brief contribution we describe the difference in treatment and ask what might 
explain the difference. While in network industries, the benefits of competition, subject to 
appropriate  regulation,  are  being  emphasized,  it  seems  that  in  the  discussion  of  the 
liberalisation of the gambling sector, the focus is on the cost associated with competition. 
One wonders about the asymmetric treatment and whether, from an economic point of 
view, such asymmetry is justified. As we will see, in both policy areas, a more balanced 
approach would be desirable. 
 
2.  LIBERALISATION: NETWORK INDUSTRIES 
 
The  Competition  website  of  the  European  Commission  contains  a  section 
“Liberalisation” that describes, in broad terms, the advantages of market liberalisation, 
the powers of the European Commission in this domain, the way network industries have 
been liberalised, and the side measures that have to been taken - the additional regulation 
required- in order to make market liberalisation into a success. 
 
In describing the powers of the Commission in this domain, the web site links the term 
liberalisation to Article 3 of the EC Treaty, which states that the Commission shall ensure 
that competition in the internal market is not distorted, and to Article 86 (3) of the EU 
Treaty, which entrusts the Commission with a specific surveillance duty with respect to 
public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive 
rights.  It  is  stated  that  “The  Commission  must  where  necessary,  address  appropriate 
directives or decisions to Member States which enact or maintain in force any measure 
contrary to the rules contained in the Treaty, in particular to these rules provided for in 
Article 12 and in Articles 81 to 89”. There is also reference to the more limited powers in 
the  context  of  services  of  general  economic  interest,  that  is  economic  (or  market) 
activities that warrant special public intervention. For these services, Article 86.2 of the   4 
Treaty is relevant: providers of services of general economic interest are subject to the 
rules contained in the Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the 
application  of  these  rules  does  not  obstruct  the  performance  of  the  particular  tasks 
assigned to them. In particular, “the development of trade must not be effected to such an 
extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Community”. 
 
With respect to liberalisation, the Commission stresses the advantages for consumers: 
“By opening up these markets to international competition, consumers can now choose 
from alternative service providers and products. Opening up these markets to competition 
has also allowed consumers to benefit from lower prices and new services, which are 
usually more efficient and consumer-friendly than before”. There is also a link between 
liberalisation  and  the  competitiveness  of  the  European  economy:  not  only  final 
consumers, but also industry consumes the products of the network industries, so that 
lower priced, or higher quality services “helps to make our economy more competitive”. 
In various progress reports, the Commission has indeed documented these gains, but it 
should be stated, and is also admitted by the Commission, that they are larger in some 
sectors  than  in  others.  Part  of  the  explanation  comes  from  the  fact  that  there  are 
considerable differences between the various network industries and that this was not 
adequately reflected in the recipe that was used for reforming them, but this is not the 
place to discuss these issues. In any case, the Commission rightly notes: “Opening up 
new markets requires additional regulation to ensure that public services continue to be 
provided and that the consumer is not adversely affected”. 
 
It is, hence, simple to summarize the policy: liberalisation brings consumer benefits; there 
are certain risks as well, but these can be handled by appropriate regulation. Competition 
is the rule, not the exception. 
 
3.  LACK OF LIBERALISATION: THE GAMBLING INDUSTRY 
 
In most EU Member States, suppliers of gambling services, of whatever form, need to 
have a license. Frequently, only a limited number of licenses is given out and in several   5 
countries only one license is available for certain forms of gambling, such as operating a 
casino, or organizing a lottery. In addition, this exclusive license may be in the hands of a 
state-owned company. For a detailed overview of the legal regimes governing gambling 
and games of chance in the European Union, we refer to the extensive survey of the 
Swiss Institute of Comparative Law that is available on the web site of the DG Internal 
Market  and  Services  of  the  European  Commission;  see 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/gambling_en.htm.) Competition, therefore, is 
restricted, and in some cases, severely so, with trade being limited as a consequence. 
Even though the general arguments mentioned in the previous Section apply, as do the 
articles from the Treaty mentioned there, the gambling services have not been subject to 
liberalisation policies and the DG Competition has not played a very active role. The lead 
has been taken, not by the Commissioner for Competition, but by Internal Market and 
Services Commissioner Charlie McCreevy, who, as shown in the Introduction, has acted 
in  a  very  cautious  way.  There  is  no  harmonisation  of  legislation  and  no  market 
liberalisation. Competition is not the rule, but the exception. 
 
In several Member States that maintain a limited licensing regime, potential entrants have 
challenged the system. They have claimed that the system would violate in particular the 
Articles 43 and 49 of the EC Treaty that guarantee the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services. The case law of the European Court of Justice has clarified 
under what conditions a restrictive licensing regime for gambling would not violate these 
articles and what type of restrictions would be justified in this case. As these issues were 
extensively discussed during the previous Tilburg Symposium on Gambling (see Littler, 
2007), there is no need to repeat that discussion here. For my purposes, it suffices to 
recall the main elements of the Gambelli judgment of the European  Court of Justice 
(Case C-243/01):  
 
“in order to be justified, the restrictions on freedom of establishment and on 
freedom to provide services must (…) be justified by imperative requirements 
in  the  general  interest,  be  suitable  for  achieving the  objective  which  they 
pursue and not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it. They must in   6 
any event be applied without discrimination.” (Gambelli, paragraphs 64 and 
65.) 
 
The ECJ has given guidance on what might qualify as “imperative requirements in the 
general interest”. In particular, the Court has indicated that frequently invoked arguments, 
such as the preservation of public order, protection against gambling addiction, and the 
prevention of fraud and money laundering, might qualify. The Court has made clear that 
national  authorities  have  a  margin  of  appreciation  in  determining  what  consumer 
protection and the preservation of public order require, but that policy to achieve the 
goals, the restrictions imposed, must be “consistent and systematic”: a Member State 
cannot ban certain private providers while at the same time strongly encouraging citizens 
to  gamble  in  state  casinos.  Furthermore,  the  ECJ  has  stated  that  it  is  for  the  natural 
authorities to decide whether the conditions listed in the above quotation (justifiability, 
suitability,  proportionality  and  non-discrimination)  are  satisfied.  In  the  more  recent 
Placanica case (C-360/04), the Court has further explained that, in order for a monopoly 
regime the be really effective in combating illegal gambling, it may be necessary for that 
monopoly to provide a sufficiently attractive service, and to advertise that service in an 
appropriate way; see Placanica, paragraph 55. Consequently, balancing is required: a 
modest amount of advertising by a monopoly state casino is allowed, but not too much.   
 
The Netherlands is an example of a country with a restrictive licensing regime.  For 
example, Holland Casino, a state owned company, has been given an exclusive license to 
operate  casinos  in  the  Netherlands.  The  monopoly  has  been  challenged  by  a  French 
company and on 14 March 2007 the Raad van State (the highest administrative court in 
the country) ruled on whether the monopoly provision in the Dutch Gambling Law was 
compatible with Article 49 of the EC Treaty; see Decision in Case LJN BA0670. The 
Court reached its decision by using the Gambelli criteria mentioned above, and by also 
taking into account the additional insights offered by Placanica. It came to the conclusion 
that  the  above-mentioned  goals  (which  were  also  the  ones  invoked  by  the  Dutch 
government  and  by  Holland  Casino)  were  of  imperative  public  interest  and  that  the   7 
monopoly  was  an  effective  and  proportional  measure.  In  the  Council’s  view,  the 
Gambelli criteria were satisfied. 
 
Although the motivation of the Raad van State (Council of State) was brief, it touched on 
issues of competition. In the Council’s view, competition between providers of gambling 
services would induce each of these to offer better deals to consumers, such in an attempt 
to attract as many costumers as possible, and this having the possible consequence of 
leading to more gambling addicts. As such, competition would be undesirable; see the 
Decision in Case LJN BA0670 at paragraph 2.6.4.) It should be remarked, however, that 
the Council did not really discuss the proportionality requirement, that is, the requirement 
that the monopoly does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain the policy 
aims.  It  satisfied  itself  by  remarking  that  a  monopoly  was  effective  and  that  the 
complainant had only argued that there are other effective instruments.  
 
In this respect, the Council sides with the Dutch State, that had earlier made similar 
arguments  in  response  to  the  official  request  for  information  that  the  European 
Commission had sent to the Netherlands on 4 April 2006 (Tweede Kamer, 2006). In the 
letter of 12 July 2006, The Dutch Minister of Justice explains the Dutch policy with 
respect to gambling and its goals, and how these have evolved over time, and he argues 
that,  in  his  view,  the  Dutch  Gambling  Law  is  in  Agreement  with  the  criteria  from 
Gambelli and, hence, does not violate any European Law. The Section of the letter that 
deals with the proportionality requirement (the first and third paragraph on page 11) is, 
however,  very  brief:  there  are  only  a  few  remarks,  in  essence  stating  only  that  this 
belongs to the margin of discretion of a Member State. Strictly speaking, proving that the 
restrictions do “not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain the goals” would seem 
to require a comparison with other measures that would also attain the goals, but that 
would possibly be less intrusive. No comparisons are, however, made. 
 
The latest development is quite recent. On 2 August 2007, the responsible minister of 
Justice sent a bill for a new Dutch Gambling Law to parliament, in which the restrictive 
licensing regime is maintained. In the explanatory memorandum to the Law (available at   8 
http://www.minjus.nl/images/Memorie%20van%20toelichting_tcm34-80692.pdf),  it  is 
remarked that the previous court decisions have shown that monopoly regime does not 
violate the EC Treaty; no new arguments are being offered. Again, there are very few 
remarks about proportionality. Strictly speaking, as far as the proportionality requirement 
is concerned, it has not been proved that the proportionality requirement is satisfied It is 
just that plaintiffs have not been able to show that it is violated. From an economic point 
of view, there are the prior questions about how to make the proportionality requirement 
operational and how to translate it in economic language. As far as I have been able to 
verify, the case law does not provide any guidance on these issues. As I will argue below, 
if  a  translation  is  made  in  terms  of  Pareto  improvements,  or  potential  Pareto 
improvements, which appears natural, the proportionality requirement might very well 
not be satisfied. In short, it seems likely that alternative, less restrictive, measures exist, 
that are associated with higher economic welfare.  
 
Of course, the reader will have noticed the asymmetry with respect to the arguments 
given  in  the  previous  section.  There  the  discussion  was  dominated  by  the  gains  in 
consumer surplus that could be obtained and it was argued that the possible negative side 
effects should be dealt with by regulation. In the case of gambling, the negative side 
effects (which are only possible and not quantified) dominate the discussion; the possible 
gains  in  consumer  surplus  are  only  mentioned  in  passing,  if  at  all,  and  they  are  not 
discussed. In effect, they are not taken into account. 
 
4.  ECONOMIC ASPECTS AND ARGUMENTS 
 
From a technical and economic perspective, the network industries, of course, are very 
different from the gambling industries. In the language of economics, there are different 
types  of  market  failures  that  characterize  these  industries.  In  the  former,  there  are 
segments  that  can  be  classified  as  natural  monopolies,  hence,  costs  are  minimized 
whenever there is just one supplier. In addition, costs may be large and sunk, hence, even 
though competition may be feasible, there is the risk of cut- throat competition, hence, 
entering into such a segment is risky. In short, monopolies arise naturally. In this context,   9 
regulation also arises naturally, to curb the market power associated with the monopoly 
and to protect the interests of the consumers. 
 
In contrast, in the gambling industries, monopolies are not natural, but artificial. They 
arise as a result of regulation that limits competition. (It should be noted that an exception 
should, perhaps, be made for lotteries: if gamblers prefer, everything else equal, larger 
main prizes, then a lottery with more participants will be able to offer a better deal, and a 
monopoly  might  arise  endogenously.  In  short,  there  may  be  network  effects,  and  a 
monopoly  may  have  an  advantage  on  the  demand  side,  instead  of  lower  cost.) 
Nevertheless, this is not to say that regulation is unnatural. The public interest concerns 
mentioned in the previous section are real and may very well give rise to regulation. In 
the  language  of  economics:  the  gambling  industry  is  associated  with  (negative) 
externalities, while, perhaps, also the usual assumption of full consumer rationality may 
be problematic. (The standard economic approach assumes that consumers act rationally, 
hence, they do what they most prefer. The act of gambling thus is evidence that the 
consumer prefers this activity to something else. Clearly, consumers may not always be 
as rational as the standard model assumes, but in this respect there may not be that much 
difference between gambling and the purchasing of electricity; see Waddams and Wilson 
(2007). 
 
Large as the differences between these sectors may be, there are also similarities. In both, 
competition may have positive as well as negative aspects; in neither is the picture one-
sided. Nevertheless, it seems that in each of them, only one side of the picture is stressed. 
 
Within  Europe,  the  liberalisation  of  the  network  industries  plays  a  major  role  in  the 
Lisbon strategy, which aims to make the European economy more competitive. Firms 
that  have  lower  input  cost,  or  that  can  use  inputs  of  higher  quality,  will  be  more 
competitive, hence, here we see a difference between network services and gambling 
services; the latter are consumed almost exclusively by final consumers, the former also 
provide inputs to firms. Consequently, there will be more pressure on network firms to 
deliver value for money than there will be on gambling firms. Be that as it may, let us   10 
look at the arguments used by policy makers for why liberalisation would yield benefits. 
In European Commission (2005), a representative paper in this area, three general types 
of  benefits  are  being  mentioned:  liberalisation  will  lead  to  lower  cost  (increased 
productive efficiency), lower prices (increased allocative efficiency) and more innovation 
(enhanced dynamic efficient efficiency). The arguments in that paper are rather general 
and,  it  has  to  be  admitted,  not  always  backed  up  by  careful  empirical  studies,  or 
convincing theoretical models. For sure, the intuition goes in the direction of enhanced 
efficiency, and there are studies that confirm this intuition (and there are more and more 
of these), but scientific proof seems to follow policy, rather than the other way around. 
 
There is no reason why the three types of beneficial effects of market liberalisation would 
also not be present in the gambling industry. Competition generally forces firms to pay 
more attention to cost and to offer customers a better deal. Indeed, the Dutch Council of 
State,  in  the  decision  referred  to  above,  explicitly  acknowledged  the  latter  effect. 
Furthermore, the presentation of Professor Eadington at this conference illustrated that 
jurisdictions that treat gambling in a more liberal way do indeed see more innovation. 
Consequently,  although  liberalising  the  gambling  markets  may  be  associated  with 
negative side effects, there are positive effects as well. 
 
A problem is that, at the moment, such positive effects are not always recognized. The 
discussion in Europe is dominated by the legal criteria developed by the European Court 
of Justice and these do not explicitly refer to the joy (utility) of gambling experienced by 
the regular (non-problem) gamblers. At least in the Dutch case referred to above, when 
applying the criteria from Gambelli, neither the Dutch Council of State, nor the Dutch 
Government  did  take  the  interests  of  these  gamblers  into  account.  The  same  remark 
applies to the Decision of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in Case C03/306HR 
(LJN: AR4841) concerning De Lotto and Ladbrokes. As also noted in the contribution of 
Prof. Forrest to this symposium, existing research on the consumer surplus associated 
with gambling is scarce, but the results that do exist (for example Farrell and Walker, 
1999)  clearly  suggests  that  the  effects  may  be  rather  large,  and,  hence,  cannot  be 
neglected. (The authors estimate the consumer surplus associated with the UK market for   11 
lottery tickets to be just below £1 billion per annum – the same order of magnitude as 
reducing  the  rate  of  income  tax  by  0.5%.)  As  non-problem  gamblers  benefit  from 
increased competition in a variety of ways, as indicated above, the gains in consumer 
welfare associated with market liberalisation should also not be underestimated; at least 
they should be recognized. 
 
From an economic point of view, the interests of the “regular” gamblers should be taken 
into account in the proportionality test. If two measures would be equally effective in 
dealing with the imperative requirements of general interest, but measure A would be 
associated with lower cost (or higher utility) to regular gamblers than measure B, then 
measure  A  would  be  preferred.  This  corresponds  to  the  usual  criterion  of  Pareto 
efficiency  from  welfare  economics.  More  generally,  if  A  would  be  somewhat  less 
effective, but the “regular” gamblers would gain so much that they could compensate 
those that lose as a result of A being adopted instead of B, measure A might still be the 
preferred one. Again, this is the standard approach in welfare economics. 
 
In cases where market liberalisation is associated with both gains and losses, cost benefit 
analysis (CBA) provides a structural framework to identify all gains and losses and to 
trade these off against each other. In his contribution to this Symposium, Prof. Walker 
has indicated some of the fundamental problems involved in doing such analysis in the 
gambling sector. In his contribution, Tom Coryn has illustrated some of the difficulties, 
involved, as well as the possibility to abuse the method in practice. While the difficulties 
can be acknowledged, it should be noted that these also exist in other industries, such as 
network industries. In fact, the electricity industry may illustrate the usefulness of doing 
such a CBA. We have referred above to the general benefits that are expected to be 
associated with the liberalisation of network industries: consumers are expected to gain 
from lower prices, while the incumbent producer would be expected to lose. Experience 
however, show that who gains and who loses may depend on how the sector is liberalised 
and restructured. For the special case of the UK, it has been shown in Newbery and Pollit 
(1977)  that  in  contrast  to  expectations,  an  its  contrast  to  what  the  restructuring  was 
supposed to achieve, the restructuring of Britain’s Central Electricity Generation Board   12 
yielded producer gains and consumer losses. The authors performed the CBA ex post; 
had it been done ex ante, it could probably have discovered some flaws into the design, 
and, hence, could have led to higher welfare gains. Similarly, in the gambling industry, a 
CBA could lead to a more informal discussion and, hopefully, better decisions. 
 
In order to motivate the regulation of gambling and games of chance, at least in the 
Netherlands, the government no longer invokes moral arguments; instead reference is 
made to the preservation of public order, protection against gambling addiction, and the 
prevention of fraud and money laundering. In effect, these are all negative externalities 
associated with gambling. During this Symposium, Prof. Walker has argued that one of 
the major problems associated with doing a CBA related to gambling regulation revolves 
around the notion of social cost. In his path-breaking paper on social cost (Coase, 1960), 
Ronald Coase has taught us that we should not look at externalities as being one-sided: if 
the regular gambler imposes a negative externality on the problem gambler, then, vice 
versa,  the  latter  imposes  a  negative  externality  on  the  former. Without  both types  of 
gamblers being present, there would not be an externality. As the externalities are wide 
spread, contracting cannot be relied upon to provide an efficient solution, and there is a 
role  for  the  government.  That  government,  however,  should  not  take  a  one-sided 
approach, it should trade-off the right of the problem gambler to be protected against the 
right  of  the  regular  consumer  to  enjoy  gambling  services.  The  proportionality 
requirement  from  Gambelli  provides  a  way  for  doing  this,  but  it  has  not  yet  been 
interpreted in this way. Doing so would seem to be desirable and this might very well 
lead to conclusions different from the ones obtained thus far. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The gambling industries are very different from the network industries, but these two 
sectors seem to share the property that policy with respect to them is guided more by 
prior  beliefs,  or  preconceptions,  than  by  a  careful  balancing  of  the  pros  and  cons 
associated  with  the  various  policy  options.  Interestingly,  while  the  liberalisation  of 
network industries is guided foremost by the consumer benefits that can be obtained, and   13 
seems to have little attention for the risks involved and the costs associated with certain 
aspects of the proposals, the discussions in the gambling sector seem to be dominated by 
the possible negative side-effects associated with liberalisation. In both cases, a more 
balanced  approach  seems  called  for.  In  the  context  of  gambling,  this  requires  more 
attention to be paid to the consumer surplus of non-problem gamblers. This consumer 
surplus could, and should, be taken into account in the proportionality test that has been 
proposed by the ECJ in Gambelli: in order to see whether a measure does not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the specified policy aims, the external effects on consumers 
not  explicitly  mentioned  in  these  policy  aims  should  not  be  neglected.  After  all,  the 
general  interest  is  broader  than  the  particular  interests  of  those  that  could  become 
addicted to gambling. There is thus a need to balance the costs and the benefits. Cost 
benefit analysis may provide a framework that helps in taking such a more balanced 
approach.  A  Coasean  perspective  suggests  that,  in  the  absence  of  transaction  costs, 
consumers would negotiate a more liberal regime with respect to gambling, hence, that 
government policy should be less restrictive as well.  
   14 
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